

The Turkish Cypriot Legislative Election of February 2005: The Rise of CTP/BG

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In the 24 April 2004 referenda on the Cyprus peace plan, 65% of the Turkish Cypriots voted Yes while 76% Greek Cypriots voted No. Subsequently, the international community has failed to end the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots as it promised in the pre-referenda period. It was against this background that on 20 February 2005 the Turkish Cypriot electorate went to the polls in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus's eighth legislative election. The election results clearly indicate that the Turkish Cypriots are still committed to the Annan Plan and EU membership.

Keywords: Cyprus; Northern Cyprus; Turkish Cypriot; Election; Annan Plan; TRNC; EU

Background

On 24 April 2004, the Turkish and Greek Cypriots voted on the Annan Plan for the reunification of Cyprus in simultaneous and separate referenda. Although the Plan was supported by 65% of the Turkish Cypriots, it was voted down by a strong 76% majority of Greek Cypriots. As a result, on 1 May the Greek Cypriot part of the island entered the European Union (EU) as a full member while the Turkish Cypriots remained outside. On 26 April, the EU Commission prepared two draft regulations, on Direct Trade and Financial Aid, in order to help the Turkish Cypriots to integrate with the EU. However, these regulations have been blocked in the EU Council by the (Greek Cypriot) Republic of Cyprus. This has proved a major frustration for the Turkish Cypriots, who feel that the EU has not delivered on its pre-referenda promises to end their unnecessary isolation.

It was against this background that on 20 February 2005 the Turkish Cypriot electorate went to the polls for the eighth time to vote for a new parliament in an early election. In the previous parliamentary election of December 2003, the Annan Plan had been the major issue on the agenda. Indeed, the election had been almost equivalent to a referendum on the Plan (see *South European Society & Politics*, vol. 9,

no. 3), with the outcome showing the Turkish Cypriot electorate as being almost equally divided into two camps. Parties advocating a solution to the Cyprus problem based on the Annan Plan and EU membership for a united Cyprus gained slightly more than 50% of the votes, with the remaining votes going to parties that openly dismissed the Annan Plan or had serious reservations about it.

After the 2003 election, the parliamentary arithmetic permitted only a very unstable coalition government to be formed. The *Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi/Birleşik Güçler* (CTP/BG), the leading pro-solution and pro-EU party, with 19 seats (out of the total of 50) had no choice but to form a government with DP (defined below), the least anti-Annan-Plan party of the opposite camp, as its junior coalition partner with seven seats. Hence, the coalition government had only a marginal 26-seat majority. Due to the rising tension before the April 2004 referenda, almost every party had problems in imposing party discipline on its MPs with regard to either the Yes or No vote. The referenda vote was much more important than the party interest. After the referenda, the coalition government lost its majority in parliament due to the flight of three MPs, one from CTP and two from DP.

Although the coalition government no longer controlled a parliamentary majority, it did not lose a vote of confidence. However, this was a crippled government lacking the necessary parliamentary support to pass meaningful legislation, let alone govern the country. For instance, the coalition was not even able to get the 2004 budget approved by parliament. Therefore, in the autumn the government decided to resign and started the procedure for an early election, which was later scheduled for 20 February 2005.

The Campaign

The election was contested by seven political parties:

- CTP/BG—*Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi-Birleşik Güçler* (Republican Turkish Party—United Forces), founded in 1970. Leader: Mehmet Ali Talat. Centre-left and strongly pro-Annan-Plan.
- BDH—*Bariş ve Demokrasi Hareketi* (Peace and Democracy Movement), founded in 2003. Leader: Mustafa Akıncı. Left of centre and strongly pro-Annan-Plan.
- TKP-BKP—*Toplumcu Kurtuluş Partisi* (Communal Liberation Party), founded in 1976. Leader: Hüseyin Angolemlı. And *Birleşik Kıbrıs Partisi Sol Güçler İttifakı* (United Cyprus Party Alliance of Leftist Forces), founded in 2002. Leader: İzzet İzcan. Left of centre and strongly pro-Annan-Plan.
- UBP—*Ulusal Birlik Partisi* (National Unity Party), founded in 1975. Leader: Derviş Eroğlu. Centre-right and strongly anti-Annan-Plan.
- DP—*Demokrat Parti* (Democrat Party), founded in 1992. Leader: Serdar Denktaş. Centre-right and neutral on Annan Plan
- YP—*Yeni Parti* (New Party), founded in 2004. Leader: Nuri Çevikel. Centre and pro-Annan-Plan.

- MAP—*Milliyetçi Adalet Partisi* (Nationalist Justice Party), founded in 1994. Leader: Ata Tepe. Right of centre and strongly anti-Annan-Plan

The 2005 campaign was considerably less colourful than its 2003 predecessor. This was the result of election fatigue. The Turkish Cypriots had been to the polls three times in 14 months (the 14 December 2003 general election, the 24 April 2004 referendum and the early legislative election of 20 February 2005). Political parties were also tired of campaigning for the third time in 14 months, while financing three successive campaigns in such a short time period proved too costly.

The level of discussion of substantive issues was considerably lower than in 2003. As already mentioned, during the previous election, the Annan Plan had been the most important campaign issue. Late 2003 had been a critical period in Cyprus's progress towards EU accession. All the political parties had studied the Plan thoroughly and discussed its political, legal and economic aspects in great detail in the media. However, after the 2004 referenda, the Cyprus issue fell into an impasse that prevented the political parties discussing anything substantive about it. As a result, the political parties resorted to 'dirty politics', focusing on personal issues concerning politicians in rival parties. Three important corruption issues that featured heavily during the election campaign concerned: DP chair Serdar Denktaş's father-in-law, who was sentenced to jail due to financial mishandling in his bank; a CTP-BG MP's connection with a murdered banker, Elmas Güzelyurtlu, who was living in Southern Cyprus; and the connection of the wife of the BDH leader, Mustafa Akıncı, with an alleged improper property sale.

Party Slogans and Strategies

CTP/BG—'Yes be annem, söz be annem!'¹

The CTP/BG appealed to the electorate with this slogan meaning 'Yes, my mum, promise my mum!' The slogan called for the electorate to say Yes to CTP/BG which means an automatic Yes to the EU membership, and the electorate *promises* (söz) their Yes vote.

The CTP/BG put the issues of a solution to the Cyprus problem and the integration of the Turkish Cypriots into the EU at the centre of its election campaign. During the campaign, CTP/BG claimed that the international community's perception of the Turkish Cypriots had changed. From being seen as the intransigent (and separatist) side in the Cyprus conflict, they were now viewed as the cooperative party that wants peace, a solution and a reunited Cyprus. The party claimed that this was due to CTP/BG's support for EU membership and to the fact that its pro-solution leader, Mehmet A. Talat, was the prime minister. The CTP/BG harped on the fact that the Turkish Cypriots' GNP per capita had more than doubled and income from tourism and trade had increased dramatically during the period of coalition government in which CTP/BG was the senior partner.

The media advertisements and campaign flyers distributed by CTP/BG featured pictures of Talat with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, US Secretary of State Colin Powell, EU Commission President José Manuel Barroso, EU High Representative Javier Solana and Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan. Here, Talat was portrayed as a world leader who spoke the world language, was acknowledged by world leaders and was the best candidate to speak for the Turkish Cypriots and explain the Cyprus issue abroad.

The CTP/BG promised the electorate that they would work hand in hand with all sectors of the Turkish Cypriot people and Turkish Cypriot NGOs in creating the perfect democracy in line with EU norms and in conducting a democratic struggle against illegality in Northern Cyprus.

UBP—‘You are not without an alternative’

During the election campaign UBP used the slogans ‘For compromise and development, the future is in your hands’ and ‘You are not without an alternative’. In the 2003 election, UBP had supported the continuation of the TRNC (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus) as the only viable solution to the Cyprus problem. In contrast, in 2005 it adopted a moderate line and advocated a compromise solution in Cyprus. The party even made references to the Annan Plan, which it had strongly rejected in 2003, while subsequently conducting a strong No campaign in the 2004 referendum. The modification of the UBP’s position on the Annan Plan is due to the fact that it wanted to appeal beyond its traditional supporters, to the 65% of the electorate who had voted for the Plan in the referendum.

The UBP emphasized that it supported a solution in Cyprus, but that this should be reached on the Turkish Cypriots’ terms. In this regard, UBP claimed that it favoured the resumption of the peace negotiations and that in the case of failure the Turkish Cypriots have an alternative, which is the continuation of the TRNC.

Derviş Eroğlu, the UBP leader, heavily criticized the CTP/BG–DP coalition government for its ‘zero performance’ on domestic issues. In addition, he criticized Prime Minister Talat for spreading unrealistic expectations among the Turkish Cypriots with regard to international affairs. Eroğlu specifically downplayed Talat’s meetings with Colin Powell, José Manuel Barroso and Javier Solana, claiming that these meetings were just for show and had not brought any significant benefit for the Turkish Cypriots in terms of lifting the restrictions on them and easing their isolation.

Although UBP promised the Turkish Cypriots that they were not without an alternative (i.e. the TRNC), the party generally failed to provide a substantive and detailed alternative programme as to how to develop North Cyprus. Such an alternative was not perceived as realistic by the majority of Turkish Cypriots, who queried why UBP had failed to achieve such a development during more than twenty years of UBP governments since 1976.

DP—‘Trust us, because we’ve never lied to you!’

The DP appealed to the electorate by claiming that it had always told the truth to the Turkish Cypriots regarding the Cyprus issue. The DP claimed that it offered neither a rosy picture to the public as the leftist parties did, nor a pessimistic one like the other right-wing parties. The DP gave the example of the 2004 referendum, in which the party had explained both the pros and cons of the Annan Plan and let its supporters decide at the polls, unlike all the other parties, which took party decisions either for or against the Plan. The DP claimed that the left-wing parties failed to acknowledge the weaknesses of the Annan Plan, while the right-wing parties exaggerated its weaknesses and ignored its strengths.

During the election campaign, DP argued that it had worked very hard as the junior partner in the coalition government, correctly diagnosing the problems and producing realistic solutions. The party promised to continue working hard and indicated that that was the only way to end the isolation of and restrictions on the Turkish Cypriots. The party leader, Serdar Denktaş, frequently emphasized that the party would not stop until a future had been built where all the problems of the Turkish Cypriots had been solved. Finally, DP in the 2005 election campaign used the slogan ‘Yes to DP will integrate the Turkish Cypriots with the world’, which was similar to the CTP/BG slogan during the 2004 referendum: ‘A Yes will connect Turkish Cypriots to the world.’

BDH—‘Warm policies’

During the election campaign, BDH talked about the Turkish Cypriots’ need to follow proactive policies with regard to the Cyprus problem. The party argued that the TRNC government and Turkey had been following passive policies. According to BDH, this was equivalent to putting the Cyprus issue, and hence the Turkish Cypriots, into the freezer. The party chair, Mustafa Akıncı, emphasized that if BDH came to power, it would follow ‘warm policies’ that would thaw the Cyprus problem. In other words, he suggested that through proactive policies the Turkish side should push for the solution of the Cyprus problem, since, if there were no solution, time was working against the Turkish Cypriots.

The BDH situated its policies in three pillars: (i) communal, (ii) inter-communal and (iii) international. On the communal level, BDH argued that the Turkish Cypriots should make serious domestic reforms, such as more democratization and transparency in governance. On the inter-communal level, the party suggested that the Turkish Cypriots work for the betterment of the relations with the Greek Cypriots by means of opening more checkpoints between the two sides and solving the issue of the missing persons in a short time. The party claimed that the Turkish Cypriot side should also work on the international level in order to inform the international community that it supported the solution and reunification of the island, as well as to push for the lifting of the restrictions on the Turkish Cypriots. The BDH, however, emphasized that lifting the restrictions on the Turkish Cypriots should not be seen as a substitute for a comprehensive solution of the Cyprus problem. The party blamed

the coalition government for only trying to lift the restrictions and not taking the necessary steps towards an overall solution to the Cyprus problem.

TKP-BKP—‘The way out: unity of forces for the rule of people’

The TKP and BKP, which had fought the 2003 election under the BDH umbrella, failed to join forces with BDH in 2005. The failure was due mostly to personal conflicts between the upper administration of the BDH and TKP. So, the social democratic TKP made an alliance with the socialist BKP and followed the most radical political line at the left of the political spectrum.

According to TKP-BKP, ‘the only way out’ for the Turkish Cypriots was to establish ‘the true rule of the people’ independent of the pro-status-quo right-wing parties and Turkey. Although it was a bit unrealistic to follow policies independent of Turkey, TKP-BKP argued that the Turkish Cypriots should unilaterally implement aspects of the Annan Plan, such as a new constitution, establishment of the Turkish Cypriot state and a new property regime. In the election campaign, TKP-BKP based their policy for the prospective solution of the Cyprus problem on: (i) the constitutional rights of the Turkish Cypriots as the equal partner of the Republic of Cyprus; (ii) the 1977 (Denktaş–Makarios) and 1979 (Denktaş–Kyprianou) High Level Agreements that called for the solution of the Cyprus problem through a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation based on the political equality of the two communities; (iii) the Annan Plan; and (iv) the EU Constitution.

YP—‘New Party: our party’

The YP is the newest party in Turkish Cypriot politics, established in late 2004. The party chairman, Nuri Çevikel, had been elected as an MP on the CTP/BG ticket in the 2003 election and left CTP/BG after the 2004 referendum. He is the son of a Turkish immigrant/settler family. Çevikel, a university professor and one of the nine children of a Turkish immigrant family, was very clear about which section of the electorate the party was appealing to. He sought the votes of Turkish immigrants/settlers or their children who had been born in the TRNC. He tried to appeal to the electorate with such slogans as ‘New Party is our party’ and ‘Vote for your own son’, clearly indicating to these voters that their interests would be best served by supporting him, since he was one of them.

Throughout the campaign, Çevikel slammed the other political parties as serving the interests of a minority of the Turkish Cypriots and claimed that the Turkish immigrants and their children had been suffering as ‘second-class’ citizens in Cyprus. Çevikel harped on the fact that since the opening of three checkpoints between the two sides, native Turkish Cypriots could work in the South and become EU citizens by getting Republic of Cyprus identity cards and passports. Çevikel argued that, although they were TRNC citizens, the Turkish immigrants had become second-class citizens and were isolated in the North. The YP promised that, once in government, it would

erase all the problems of the TRNC through more efficient administration of the financial aid (an average of US\$200 million per year) that flowed to the TRNC from Turkey.

MAP—‘We took an oath (the State will live)’

Although MAP was established in 1994, this was the first election that it had fought independently. In the previous elections it had supported larger right-wing parties, such as UBP and DP. During the election 2005 campaign, MAP promoted the most extremist right-wing propaganda in contrast to DP and UBP, both of which declared that they supported a compromise solution in Cyprus. What differentiated MAP from the other parties was its claim that it would be futile to try to reach a solution with the Greek Cypriots, since the latter wanted to control the whole island by themselves. Instead, MAP argued that the only option for the Turkish Cypriots was to hold on to their own state (TRNC), developing it into a welfare state where ‘the faces of the people will smile in peace and welfare which they deserve’. It is important to note that MAP never advocated or provoked the public to resort to violence. It seemed difficult to accept MAP’s placement on the extreme right of the political spectrum after listening to the party’s well-educated, extremely polite chairman, Ata Tepe. The latter said very gently that, in establishing the TRNC in 1983, the Turkish Cypriots had taken an oath and that they should continue honouring that oath (and help the State to live).

The Results

With an 80.8% turnout in the 2005 election, CTP/BG increased its overall votes by around 9%, scoring an increase in all five electoral districts² (see Table 1). In comparison, UBP’s vote fell by slightly more than 1%. However, UBP, by and large, kept its previous support level in all five electoral districts with the exception of İskele, where its votes dropped by about 5%. There is a good chance that the 5% drop in UBP

Table 1 2005 and 2003 General Election Results

Parties	Overall 2005		Overall 2003	
	Vote (%)	Seats	Vote (%)	Seats
CTP/BG	44.5	24	35.2	19
UBP	31.7	19	32.9	18
DP	13.5	6	12.9	7
BDH	5.8	1	13.2	6
TKP	2.4	0	—	—
MAP	0.5	0	—	—
YP	1.6	0	—	—

Note: The TKP fought the 2003 election under the banner of the umbrella party BDH, while MAP supported other right-wing parties. The YP was established in 2004.

votes in İskele shifted to CTP/BG. The DP had a slight increase in its overall votes, of just 0.5%. By and large, the support level of DP in the five electoral districts did not exceed the 1–3% range either up or down.

The two small left-wing parties, BDH and TKP, were the net losers. In 2003, TKP and other small left-wing parties with the support of NGOs fought the election under the banner of the umbrella party BDH, which had gained a total of 13.2% of the vote. In 2005, BDH and TKP fought the election separately, obtaining a combined total of 8.2% of the vote (5.8% + 2.4%). This was a drop of almost 5%, which had clearly shifted to the major centre-left party, CTP/BG. It seems likely that the Turkish Cypriot electorate punished the small left-wing parties for failing to form a united front and thereby marginalized them.

The MAP (right of centre) and YP (centre) are the two newest parties in Turkish Cypriot politics. While MAP appeals to the nationalistic emotions of the Turkish Cypriots, YP prefers to appeal only to the electorate who are Turkish immigrants/settlers or their children. In that sense, both are marginal parties. Both failed to gain a parliamentary seat.

Table 2 shows the percentage of votes the major Turkish Cypriot parties obtained in all the previous parliamentary elections since 1976. One can observe that for most of the time the combined left-wing votes (CTP + TKP) have totalled less than 40%. The CTP has steadily grown from 12.9% in 1976 to 44.5% in 2005, except in the 1998 election, during which it was undergoing dramatic transformations in its leadership and party ideology. The CTP entered the twenty-first century with its new leader, Mehmet Ali Talat, and a new left-of-centre programme that replaced its traditional socialist ideology. The party even changed its traditional flag colour from ‘red’ to ‘green’.

Table 2 Percentage of Votes Major Turkish Cypriot Parties Obtained in the Elections since 1976

Election	CTP (CTP/BG as of 2003)	UBP	DP*	BDH†	TKP	DMP‡
1976	12.9	53.7			20.2	
1981	15.1	42.5			28.5	
1985	21.4	36.7			15.8	
1990‡		54.7				44.5
1993	24.2	29.8	29.2		13.3	
1998	13.4	40.4	22.6		15.4	
2003	35.2	32.9	12.9	13.2		
2005	44.5	31.7	13.5	5.8	2.4	

*DP was established in the early 1990s by a group of pro-President-Denktaş MPs who left UBP due to conflict between President Denktaş and the UBP chief, Eroglu.

†BDH was established as an umbrella party for the 2003 election, when it included TKP and small left-wing parties and NGOs. However, due to lack of consensus among the TKP and the BDH top officials, its constituent parties failed to cooperate in the 2005 election.

‡During the 1990 election CTP and TKP together with other small parties joined forces against UBP and entered the election under the umbrella party DMP.

The combined right-wing vote has traditionally been above 60% in Turkish Cypriot politics. However, in the last two elections, it has dropped below 50%. The major party on the right, UBP, which scored its all-time high of 53.7% of votes in 1976, had declined to 31.7% of the votes in 2005.

In 2005, it seems that the Turkish Cypriot electorate preferred to vote for parties of the centre-left or centre-right. This can also be interpreted as a message from the electorate that it does not support marginalized or polarized views but rather favours moderation and consensus. In other words, the majority of the Turkish Cypriot electorate supported parties that are pro-solution and pro-EU-membership. At the same time, it disregarded 'unrealistic' programmes of both the right of centre, which championed the idea of the TRNC being internationally recognized without any compromise, and the left of centre, which supported the idea that the Turkish Cypriots should act independently of Turkey.

External Reactions to the Results

The reactions of both the EU and the US to the election results were clearly positive. Both were happy that the pro-EU Talat, who supported the Annan plan, had emerged as the net winner of the election.

According to the European Commission, 'the results indicate a clear desire of the Turkish Cypriot community to continue preparations for their full integration into the EU' (*Kıbrıs*, 21 February 2005). In addition, the Commission declared that 'the results also show that the Turkish Cypriots are committed to the reunification of Cyprus' (Commission Statement, 21 February 2005, <www.delcyp.cec.eu.int/en/news/050221a.htm>). In the European Parliament (EP), the Socialist group welcomed the election results and called for the Greek Cypriot President, Tassos Papadopoulos, to sit at the negotiation table with Talat. Graham Watson, head of the Liberal group, stated that the election results were positive and that the Turkish Cypriots had chosen 'peace and the constructive way' while expressing the hope that these results would be carefully evaluated in the South (NTV, 22 February 2005, <www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/310728.asp>). Watson suggested that the EU should have closer relations, including trade relations, with the North and that the EU should take substantive steps for the lifting of restrictions on the Turkish Cypriots. Meanwhile, Monica Frassoni, co-chair of the European Greens, interpreted the election results as 'encouraging', declaring that the Greens were very happy with Talat's victory and that it was time to resolve the Cyprus problem. She argued that the ball was currently in Papadopoulos's court and that he needed to indicate which points he opposed in the Annan Plan so that the peace negotiations could start again.

The US State Department issued an immediate press release, declaring that

In their vote, Turkish Cypriots exercised their right to participate in free, fair and democratic elections. We welcome the result as a reaffirmation of the Turkish Cypriot commitment to a comprehensive solution and reunification of the island with Greek Cypriots. (Department of State, 21 February 2005, <www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005742495.htm>)

The US stated that it would continue to work with the UN Secretary General in order to find a just and durable solution to the Cyprus problem on the basis of the Annan Plan.

Implications of the Election Results for the Prospects of a Solution

In the 2005 election, the CTP/BG–DP coalition government received the support it needed to implement its government programme. It was able to form a stronger coalition government of 30 seats as compared to the marginal 26 seats it had controlled after the 2003 election. The election results indicated a clear victory for the pro-EU and pro-Annan-Plan forces in North Cyprus.

The EU and the US also interpreted the results in this manner by showing their pleasure with Talat's victory. In his post-election victory speech, Talat swiftly offered an olive branch to the Greek Cypriots: 'I want to call on the Greek Cypriot side leadership to take our hand which we are extending in peace to them. We will continue to make our best efforts for reconciliation and a solution to the Cyprus problem' (*Kıbrıs*, 21 February 2005).

In showing the Turkish Cypriots' continued commitment to a comprehensive solution in Cyprus and integration with the EU, the 2005 election will put more pressure on the Greek Cypriot side to resume the negotiations on the basis of the Annan Plan that they rejected in the 2004 referendum. However, at the time of writing, the Greek Cypriot political leadership does not appear to have either the intention or the motivation to accept a compromise solution based on power sharing with the Turkish Cypriots. Alvaro De Soto, the former UN representative to Cyprus, recently argued that the Greek Cypriots' economic position and EU membership left no motivation for them to accept a compromise solution such as the Annan Plan (NTV, 7 March 2005, <www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/312443.asp>). Even the former Greek Cypriot foreign minister Nikos Rolandis indicated that the Greek Cypriot political leadership was not interested in a solution (*Sunday Mail*, 27 February 2005).

Given the attitude of the Greek Cypriot leadership towards resuming peace negotiations, it is up to the international community to find ways to motivate the Greek Cypriot leadership to resume negotiations. The future stability of the Turkish Cypriot government depends on the commitment of the international community, especially the EU, in delivering its promises to the Turkish Cypriots. In that sense, it will be very important to see how the international community will translate the UN Secretary General's invitation, in his 28 May 2004 *Report to the UN Security Council* (S/2004/437), into concrete steps on the ground:

The decision of the Turkish Cypriots is to be welcomed. The Turkish Cypriot leadership and Turkey have made clear their respect for the wish of the Turkish Cypriots to reunify in a bicomunal, bizonal federation. The Turkish Cypriot vote has undone any rationale for pressuring and isolating them. I would hope that the members of the Council can give a strong lead to all States to cooperate both bilaterally and in international bodies, to eliminate unnecessary restrictions and barriers that have the effect of isolating the Turkish Cypriots and impeding their development.

If the current isolation of the Turkish Cypriots continues in the future, the pro-resolution and pro-EU mood registered in the February 2005 legislative election might gradually change into a frustration which could easily be translated into more nationalistic and separatist attitudes. In that case, it would be very difficult for the CTP/BG–DP coalition government to maintain its current pro-Annan-Plan and pro-EU discourse while retaining the support of the Turkish Cypriots.

Notes

- [1] *Be annem* is Turkish Cypriot argot, literally meaning ‘my mum’, but in colloquial language it can be roughly translated as ‘my pal’ or ‘my buddy.’
- [2] The total TRNC population of 187,514 is distributed among the electoral districts as follows: Lefkoşa (Nicosia) 59,040, Mağusa (Famagusta) 49,572, Girne (Kyrenia) 33,942, Güzelyurt (Morphou) 24,715 and İskele (Trikomo) 20,245. The Higher Election Council has determined the electorate in these districts to be as follows: Lefkoşa 46,308, Mağusa 38,681, Girne 27,255, Güzelyurt 19,823 and İskele 15,182.